The new India-US defence pact offers reassurance in uncertain times—Will dissonance in other areas test its success?

More importantly, backed by steady growth in political and security ties, India–US relations have witnessed a growing alignment between expectations and realities. However, since the onset of the second Donald Trump administration, a series of unfavourable political developments have widened the gap between perception and progress. Trump’s characteristic theatrics have contributed to a decline in perception even as substantive developments in ties sustain optimism.

In one such development, India’s defence minister Rajnath Singh and US secretary of war Pete Hegeseth on 31 October signed the US-India Defense Framework Agreement.

This is much needed for at least four reasons. First, it comes at a politically sensitive time when the Trump administration has imposed on India one of the highest tariffs on any country. Second, the promise of momentum in defence could go a long way in reassuring the trade talks between the two countries as defence and trade are joined at the hip.

Third, the agreement could usher the swift supply of critical defence equipment to India and galvanise technology cooperation and exchanges ahead of the two countries’ plans to co-produce systems together in India.

Last, the agreement renews the decadal promise of cooperation between India and the US which started when the Agreed Minute on Defense Relations Between the United States and India was signed in 1995.

This was followed by the New Framework for the US-India Defense Relationship signed in 2005 between Pranab Mukherjee, the then defence minister and his US counterpart Donald Rumsfeld.

In June 2015, India and the US signed a new defence framework agreement led by US defense secretary Ash Carter and Indian defence minister Manohar Parrikar.

The 2025 framework marks a pivotal moment in shaping a new roadmap for the India-US defence and security relationship at a time when battlespace requirements, technologies and the nature of warfare are evolving at breakneck speed.

The 10-year framework in that backdrop provides a robust model for the bilateral security partnership, allowing for periodic review and recalibration in critical sectors, which is particularly important for a relationship marked by high expectation of technological interdependence.

The agreement is being viewed as a key step in advancing regional stability, deterrence, information sharing and technology cooperation. Beyond specific gains in the defence domain, it adopts a long-term strategic outlook on regional security and stability in the Indo-Pacific. Its emphasis on ensuring a free, open and rules-based Indo-Pacific appears to have restored some of the waning confidence in the direction of regional security under the second Trump administration.

However, there remains a need to distinguish between the administration’s ongoing tactical adjustments in the Indo-Pacific and its broader regional security vision. Within that distinction may lie answers to the Trump administration’s seemingly non-committal attitude toward the Indo-Pacific and to certain policy moves that have unsettled the foundation of a collective, multilateral security strategy that was designed to uphold regional rules and operational freedom.

In particular, there is a clear dissonance between Washington’s declared commitment to Indo-Pacific security, evident in numerous high-level visits and statements, and its apparent urgency to strike an economic deal with China.

The recent US–China economic agreement, reached on the sidelines of the Asean summit, may have benefited American companies, manufacturing and supply chains, but it risks undermining the strategic coherence built by key regional partners such as India, Japan and Australia under the Quad framework. By doing so, it potentially ties the United States’ strategic hands in the region. As such, the tenets of the new defence framework will face their greatest tests during implementation.

If the 2015 framework offers any lessons, it is that the India-US defence partnership must accelerate decision-making and coordination. The previous decade’s commitments, particularly under the Defense Trade and Technology Initiative, to promote joint innovation and develop cooperative technological and industrial linkages, have at best remained a work-in-progress.

Under the renewed political and diplomatic pressures of the second Trump administration to boost investments, there is also a risk that the India-US relationship could regress into a buyer–seller dynamic—a model both sides pledged to move beyond in 2015.

In hindsight, it is imperative for both nations to reflect on the new decadal promise and ensure that the partnership remains anchored in shared innovation, trust and strategic depth. The path to 2035, when the current agreement will be renewed, is a long arc and how both sides choose to travel it will define the next chapter of their defence and security ties.

The authors are, respectively, vice president for studies, and fellow, Americas at the Observer Research Foundation, New Delhi.