Power is being monopolised in Ukraine

They do not look like old-style defence types, but they are transforming Ukraine’s war. Three years ago they were making 30 drones a month. Now they are up to 1,300 a month, ranging from slow drones ($580,000 for a set of ten) to a new ballistic missile (at $1m a piece). They cost a fraction of what foreign ones do, and are based on open-source designs, meaning that they are not bound by foreign-usage restrictions. “We don’t want to have any dependence on America’s politics,” says the firm’s founder, whose name cannot be disclosed for security reasons.

When Russia launched its full-scale invasion in 2022, Ukraine’s war-fighting effort utterly depended on American and European supplies. Yet over the past three years its own military manufacturing capacity has gone from $1bn- to $35bn-worth of materiel per year, according to Oleksandr Kamyshin, a presidential adviser overseeing the industry. 

Faster than anyone would have predicted, Ukraine is becoming self-sufficient in many types of weaponry. But big gaps remain. Ukraine still cannot make systems capable of knocking out incoming Russian missiles.

Manpower is another problem. Mobilisation has been mishandled: troops’ rotations away from the front are infrequent; draft agents seize people arbitrarily; and the government has hesitated to lower the age of conscription. 

Still, the army has grown, and elite units continue to attract recruits. Most important, drones have sharply reduced Russia’s numerical advantage: according to some estimates, 75% of all casualties suffered by the Russian army are inflicted by them.

Ukraine’s worst fragility may be not military but political. Since the start of the war, many liberal and moderate Ukrainians have faced a dilemma. Drawing attention to incompetence, corruption or mismanagement by the government risks undermining international support. 

But keeping silent means accepting Volodymyr Zelensky’s increasing monopoly of power, which has sometimes undermined the state’s effectiveness and even the war effort itself. “While the Western media and European leaders have lionised Zelensky and turned him into a celebrity, we feel trapped,” says Yulia Mostovaya, the editor of ZN.UA, an independent online daily.

If criticising Mr Zelensky was difficult before Mr Trump attacked him in February for being “a dictator”, doing so now is all but impossible. Ukrainians have rallied around the president to such an extent that he appears to be considering holding elections. “If Zelensky feels he has no competitors, that means elections are approaching,” quips one official. In preparation for the possibility of them, the state appears to be tightening its grip.

In February Petro Poroshenko, who leads the largest opposition party, was penalised for unspecified “threats to national security”. His assets have been frozen. He is also being charged with “treason” in a legal case which looks to critics like lawfare. The sanctions in effect bar him from contesting any election. 

However much Ukrainians may dislike Mr Poroshenko, many see this as a dangerous precedent. “If Poroshenko can be barred from an electoral process without any court decision, so can anyone else,” says Olexiy Honcharenko, a member of Ukraine’s parliament, the Rada.

Civil-society activists are also being harassed. Vitaly Shabunin, an anti-corruption crusader, who had enlisted in the first days of the war while also exposing graft in Ukraine’s defence ministry, has long been targeted. His latest investigation was met with snide vengeance. To punish him, he has been sent close to the front; details of his work there are sent daily to the authorities. Such methods recall Vladimir Putin’s early years of rule, says Mr Shabunin, at least in their pettiness.

Ukraine’s politics is a far cry from Russia’s, and concentrating power is a natural consequence of war. But some of Ukraine’s staunchest supporters increasingly worry it may be going too far.

True, Ukraine’s democracy was never really based on the rule of law. Its pluralism was provided by the diversity of its regions, the competing interests of its power groups, and a vocal civil society that relied on the support of Western embassies and the media. But all these checks are being weakened or removed.

In the name of efficiency, power is being concentrated not in the government or the parliament, but in the hands of a few unelected officials in the presidential administration, including Andriy Yermak, the chief of staff, Dmytro Lytvyn, Mr Zelensky’s speechwriter, and Oleh Tatarov, who oversees the security agencies. 

The administration is reluctant to share power not just with opponents but with anyone seen as a potential rival. Loyalists are rewarded with seats on the boards of state firms. Those who show too much independence, have too much popular support or enjoy direct lines of communication to Western countries have been fired or sidelined. This includes Valery Zaluzhny, the popular commander of Ukrainian forces, removed in February 2024 and sent to be ambassador in London. Others pushed out include Oleksandr Kubrakov, a former minister of infrastructure; Dmytro Kuleba, a former foreign minister; and Mustafa Nayem, who led the agency for reconstruction.

Differences of opinion and critical media are seen as a threat, rather than a strength. Sevgil Musaeva, the editor of Ukrainska Pravda, the country’s leading independent online publication, complains that instead of dealing with the reasons that prompt journalistic investigations, the presidential office responds by restricting access, targeting advertisers and seeing any contact with its journalists as treachery. “This is not systemic censorship, but if we don’t resist, the free space will disappear before we know it,” she says.

Ukraine’s move towards more authoritarian rule is unsurprising given the pressures it faces as the war grinds on well into its fourth year. Yet the risk is that it undermines the country’s self-organising resilience. As Mr Honcharenko puts it: “We have demonstrated that a small democracy can resist a larger autocracy and turn itself into a porcupine. But a small autocracy can be swallowed by a larger one.”

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